

ELEVENTH NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS'  
CONFERENCE

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R E P O R T

OF THE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DELEGA-  
TION TO THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF MEMBERS OF  
PARLIAMENT FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES, HELD IN NEW  
YORK CITY, OCTOBER 4-9, 1965

PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC LAW 689, 84TH CONGRESS



JUNE 23, 1966.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on  
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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## FOREWORD

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This is a report on the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in accordance with Public Law 689, 84th Congress, which provides for congressional participation in meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Parliamentary Conference. Since the House and Senate delegations to the Conference are named separately, the report is submitted by me on behalf of the House delegation in my capacity as its chairman.

WAYNE L. HAYS, *Chairman.*

1927

1928

# REPORT

The following report was prepared by the Committee on the part of the Board of Directors of the American Society of Civil Engineers, and is published for the information of the members of the Society.

Respectfully,  
The Committee on the part of the Board of Directors



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# Union Calendar No. 742

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## ELEVENTH NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS' CONFERENCE

JUNE 23, 1966.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the [State  
of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. HAYS, from the delegation of the U.S. House of Representatives  
to the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, submitted the  
following

### R E P O R T

[Pursuant to Public Law 689, 84th Cong.]

The delegation appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, pursuant to the authority contained in Public Law 689, 84th Congress, herewith submits a report of sessions which took place in New York City during the period of October 4-9, 1965.

#### CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCE

The Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was held at the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York City with all of the 15 North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries represented and some 150 delegates in attendance.

The U.S. delegation consisted of the following Members of Congress:

From the House of Representatives:

Wayne L. Hays, of Ohio, Chairman  
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., of New Jersey  
Winfield K. Denton, of Indiana  
L. Mendel Rivers, of South Carolina  
Frank M. Clark, of Pennsylvania  
Leslie C. Arends, of Illinois  
Charles E. Chamberlain, of Michigan  
William H. Bates, of Massachusetts.  
Paul Findley, of Illinois

From the Senate:

Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island, Chairman  
Harrison A. Williams, New Jersey  
Maurine Neuberger, Oregon  
Birch Bayh, Indiana  
Robert F. Kennedy, New York  
Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts  
Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota

Jacob K. Javits, New York  
Clifford P. Case, New Jersey  
Frank E. Moss, Utah, alternate

The U.S. delegation met in Washington on Thursday, September 30, for a briefing by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball. Then, since U.S. participation in the Conference is as a single delegation, the joint House-Senate delegation elected Senator Claiborne Pell as its chairman, and Representative Leslie C. Arends, vice chairman. Representative Wayne L. Hays was reelected as the U.S. member of the Standing Committee of the Conference. Assignments to the other five Conference committees were made as follows:

*Political Committee.*—Senators Pell, Javits, and Kennedy; Representatives Hays and Arends.

*Military Committee.*—Senators Saltonstall and Moss; Representatives Rivers, Clark, Chamberlain, and Bates.

*Economic Committee.*—Senator Bayh; Representatives Denton and Findley.

*Scientific and Technical Committee.*—Senator Case; Representative Rodino.

*Cultural Affairs and Information Committee.*—Senators Mundt, Neuberger, and Williams; Representatives Denton and Chamberlain.

#### CONFERENCE ACTION

The Eleventh Annual Conference of the NATO Parliamentarians was opened in plenary session on Monday morning, October 4, 1965, by the President, Senator Henri Moreau de Melen of Belgium. He first called on Representative Hays who, as the U.S. member of the Standing Committee, read the following message from President Johnson:

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the United States. I regret that I cannot join in your discussions in the coming days, for I was myself a parliamentarian during my service in the House of Representatives and the Senate of my country. Constructive parliamentarian discussion is a great source of strength. Not only can it reconcile differences, but it can also add a creative dimension to government. I recall how the U.S. Congress gained from the participation by some of our members in annual conferences of NATO Parliamentarians. It makes us more vividly aware of the common interests and shared destinies that link our countries. I have asked Vice President Humphrey to represent me tomorrow. My best wishes for a successful conference.

Senator Pell, as chairman of the U.S. delegation, next welcomed the delegates after which President Moreau de Melen addressed the Conference. In his address he emphasized that the Alliance continues to be indispensable and paid tribute to the efforts of the United States in its support. The Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Manlio Brosio, followed and developed the point that the Alliance continues to be as necessary as ever, and then discussed the various reform proposals growing out of changes in the world situation since 1949.

The Secretary General's speech concluded the opening session and the Conference adjourned until Tuesday morning to enable delegates to attend the United Nations General Assembly session addressed by Pope Paul.

The plenary session on Tuesday morning was devoted to a speech by Vice President Humphrey who welcomed the delegates as a fellow NATO Parliamentarian. Then, after stressing the necessity to maintain and strengthen NATO in the light of changing circumstances, he turned to three other areas of need for common action. These needs for coordination, he said, are in our assistance to Latin America, Africa, and Asia; next, in averting the spread of nuclear weapons under national control; and, finally, to seek a common approach to disarmament and arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The committees of the Conference met on Tuesday afternoon and continued their meetings on through Wednesday. The resolutions and recommendations of the committees were then submitted to the Drafting Committee for screening and presentation to the Conference in plenary session. The final 2 days of the Conference were spent in plenary session debate and submission of the committee resolutions and recommendations. The texts of the resolutions and recommendations as adopted are included in appendix II to this report. Much of the debate was on the report submitted to the Political Committee by its rapporteur, M. M. Boscher of France. As stated in the preface to the report (*infra*, p. 6) the Committee did not approve it but permitted it to go forward "to allow freedom of expression and debate in plenary session." It was generally agreed that the resulting debate was one of the most interesting and forceful in the history of the Conference.

Following adoption of the resolutions and recommendations on Friday afternoon, the Conference elected its officers for the coming year. Then with the new President, Dr. Soares da Fonseca, of Portugal, in the chair, the budget for 1966 was adopted to conclude the business of the Eleventh Conference.

#### CONFERENCE OFFICERS

The Conference elected the following officers for the coming year:

President: Dr. J. Soares da Fonseca, Portugal.

First Vice President: M. Jean-Eudes Dubé, Canada.

Vice Presidents:

Dr. Georg Kliesing, Germany.

M. H. Moreau de Melen, Belgium.

Hon. Wayne L. Hays, United States.

Honorary Treasurer: M. Jean Chamant, France.

The following delegates were elected chairmen of committees:

Political Committee: Mr. A. E. M. Duynstee, Netherlands.

Military Committee: Sir Fitzroy Maclean, United Kingdom.

Economic Committee: Hon. Anthony Kershaw, United Kingdom.

Scientific and Technical Committee: Prof. Georges Portmann, France.

Cultural Affairs and Information Committee: Hon. Karl E. Mundt, United States.

Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries: Hon. Jacob K. Javits, United States.







## APPENDIXES

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### APPENDIX I

#### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

As of the time of filing this report, the total of all expenditures by the House delegation to the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference from the appropriation of \$15,000 was \$9,414.22.

## APPENDIX II

### REPORTS, RESOLUTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS' CONFERENCE, NEW YORK CITY, OCTOBER 4-9, 1965

#### Part I—Reports:

- Report to the Political Committee.
- Report of the Military Committee.
- Report of the Economic Committee.
- Report of the Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries.
- Report of the Scientific and Technical Committee.
- Report of the Cultural Affairs and Information Committee.

#### Part II—Resolutions and recommendations:

- Political Committee: Resolutions I to III, Recommendations I and II.
- Military Committee: Resolution and Recommendations I and II.
- Military and Political Committees: Joint resolution.
- Economic Committee: Recommendations I and II.
- Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries: Resolution.
- Scientific and Technical Committee: Recommendations I to III.
- Cultural Affairs and Information Committee: Recommendations I to IV.

## PART I—REPORTS

### REPORT TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

Submitted by M. M. BOSCHER, France, Rapporteur—Noted by the Political Committee

## PREFACE

The Committee discussed at great length this Report submitted by its Rapporteur, Mr. Boscher, and was impressed by its high intellectual calibre. The Committee could agree to certain points in this report but, on balance, would not wish to subscribe to its contents as a whole. Hence, the Committee does not approve the Report but, in order to allow freedom of expression and debate in plenary session, has permitted the Report to go forward.

## REPORT

An Austrian periodical recently published an article by a group of experts who had been studying the position of their countries in relation to various political blocs. Speaking of NATO, they said that that organisation was "a historical relic rather than a real political entity."

Unfortunately, there seems to be a considerable amount of truth in that harsh appraisal.

The internal development of the Alliance and the part it has played on the international stage since Mr. John Lindsay presented his report to our Committee at about this time last year lend some substance to that criticism.

So far as the Alliance is concerned, the year just past has been marked by a permanent division between the allies on the organisation's political and strategic concepts. Public opinion has been made aware of this divergence of view by the discussions on plans to integrate military forces, the successive versions of which are known as the MLF and the ANF.

Although these plans seem to have been put on ice since January—quite rightly, in our view—and publicity on the controversies surrounding them has consequently faded, it is still true that the antagonism they have brought forth remains and will undoubtedly revive the moment one side or the other wishes to depart from the status quo.

This means that the main problem still facing the Committee—and the Conference as a whole—is the evolution of the Alliance and its adjustment to world political and military circumstances which bear little relation to those of 1949.

A special committee set up by the Conference in November 1964 is studying suggestions for reforming the Alliance, but whatever proposals may be formulated, whatever interest the Governments may take in them, there is no possibility of such plans being put into effect before 1969 at the earliest.

In the meantime, life must go on, and that is why your rapporteur does not feel he can just forget about the next 4 years and pass over this essential problem in silence.

The reason why it has been so difficult to put the successive plans known as the MLF and the ANF into some concrete form is that they provided no solution whatever to the dilemma facing the Alliance: how to establish equality of rights and duties between the allies within a politico-military framework in which the actual preponderance of one of them produces a permanent imbalance. Obviously, the well-known quip can be applied to NATO, that it is an alliance of associates who are equal before the law, but that one of them is more equal than the others.

Partnership is easy to define in theory, but it is infinitely more difficult to translate into fact, the more so because political considerations become mixed up with military demands for nuclear effectiveness, which requires—with regard to the present disproportion of strength—not partnership even between two associates, but absolute unity of decision.

Thus, either—and this is the attitude of some small countries which have no nuclear military power—people simply accept the American defence shield and plump for military effectiveness, abandoning the right to determine the conditions of their own survival, or

they regard the political aspect as more important than the military and seek to be masters of their own fate, at which point the military difficulties become apparent.

None of the more or less complicated systems thought up so far solve this problem. These systems are either quite artificial, or else, in order to establish themselves, they take as solved other problems which are almost as difficult.

The MLF created an illusion of equality—equality on the lines of the rabbit pie made of one horse, one rabbit—but the decision to use it remained unilateral. The ANF, to be acceptable, assumes the problem of the European veto to be solved, or in other words the existence of European political unity.

In fact, it seems clear that military problems in all their magnitude cannot be considered by the Alliance objectively and constructively unless the political framework essential for their solution has been mapped out.

It is therefore not a bad idea, perhaps, to refer to our origins in order to pinpoint the problem better.

Although the 1949 Treaty defined its objective very clearly, namely to create a defensive alliance to meet the threat of Soviet aggression and to bind the contracting states by a system of mutual guarantees, "all for one and one for all," it did not decide what practical form this commitment to solidarity should take.

So-called military integration (which is felt by some to justify political integration) can scarcely be regarded as laid down in Articles 3 and 9 of the Treaty, which merely set up a permanent Council for the purpose of considering "matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty," of which the Defence Committee is simply the instrument, and provide that the Parties "separately and jointly \* \* \* will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Be it noted in passing that this latter paragraph justifies the creation of national nuclear forces quite as much as that of an "integrated" force.

In actual fact, the development to which people want to subject the mechanism of military solidarity arises out of a very wide interpretation of the terms of the Treaty, but is certainly not included in it. The idea of a sort of integrated Atlantic defence community, in particular, is merely, to say the least, a rather daring interpretation of the original text.

It therefore seems that if we want to progress along this line—and it is doubtless defensible from the military point of view—we can do so only by changing our terms of reference, or in other words substituting for the 1949 text some other form of words acceptable to *all* the signatories of the Washington Treaty. This means that today political problems take precedence over military ones.

Such a substitution requires agreement on the ideas to be implemented. But we must face the fact that, although it seems that everyone would agree today that the Western Alliance remains a constant element in the policy of the member countries and that no one wishes to deny that solidarity, the same is not true of the consequences it brings in its train.

People who try to force the hand of history run a great risk of destroying what they have in their desire to transform it.



The most we can do is try to decide on the conditions necessary for envisaging such a transformation some day.

Equality for the member countries of the Alliance in deciding their own fate is the first condition to be fulfilled. Or to put it another way, no country must be placed in the position of risking its existence without having participated in the decisions which may jeopardise that existence and having accepted them.

There are two corollaries to this: noninterference—even by persuasion—in the affairs of their allies must be the rule for all the members of the Alliance; and the countries' rights, particularly their right to be heard—more important, to be listened to—must not be measured by their material or military strength.

The idea of political equality is not incompatible with the quest for balanced resources; in fact the contrary is true.

In practical terms—and we must be practical—the team that pulls the Alliance's wagon cannot forever consist of a multiplicity of horses; sooner or later it must consist of two, and these two must of necessity be comparable.

This in turn means that we must promote the birth of the European horse, but there is a danger that its gestation may take a long time yet.

In this context, we feel that untimely activities which would result in dividing the countries of Europe would be disastrous because they would complicate the problem still further and delay the birth.

In any case, only when this unification of European defence (and, of course, of European policy) has been achieved—and in our view military Europe must necessarily include Britain—will the fundamental problem of equality of rights and of the full military effectiveness of the Alliance be solved. The Alliance will then rest, to use Mr. Lester Pearson's expression, on two equal pillars.

Each of these pillars, by the military strength it embodies, will be able to decide its own policy. The close ties binding them which in the geopolitical pattern of today are inescapable and which will remain so for an indefinite period, will forge the strongest military deterrent the world has ever known and render useless intercontinental integration.

Another condition for success in transforming the Alliance is, if not extending it to the world as a whole, at least coordinating the member countries' policies, both inside and outside the area covered at present, for it is clear that decisions outside this area taken by one country can be important to the other members of the Alliance because of their repercussions.

In this context it may be useful to point out that instituting the practice of consultations leading to coordination *as from now* would have the effect of improving the cooperative spirit within the Alliance, since one of the causes of its deterioration is the unfortunate impression created by unilateral and sometimes risky action by one member of the Alliance without prior consultation.

It should also be noted that such coordination of world policy, indeed its unification, would be the essential and inevitable corollary of any Atlantic political integration. We may well wonder whether this consequence has been fully weighed by the most active protagonists of such integration.

I shall be told that I am turning my back on any progress, any development, any improvement in the effectiveness of the Alliance on the excuse that the necessary conditions are lacking.

In fact, I am completely convinced that any effort towards radical transformation will run into these obstacles, but does that mean that all we can do is declare ourselves powerless?

On the contrary, I believe we can use the present framework of the organisation to put forward suggestions for improving its working.

(1) Even an alliance of the conventional type presupposes a fairly advanced and established degree of coordination in peacetime insofar as strategic aims and operational planning are concerned. This is all the more true in the case of an alliance that wants to be more than a coalition of sovereign states. It does not look, however, as if we have managed to progress very far along this road since 1949, even during a period when the present difficulties had not arisen and all the countries were staunchly "Atlantic" minded.

Operational planning might provide fertile ground for promoting greater unity of view among the allies. It means more than simple coordination of strategic aims, for it extends beyond the military field into that of policy. It would enable a full-dress discussion to take place on the theory of engaging nuclear forces, which has not yet been settled. Are the European, and particularly the French concept of all-out counterattack and the concept of escalated counterattack, advocated for some years now by the United States, mutually exclusive? Might not a more detailed study of practical instances lead to a definition of the point beyond which escalated counterattack loses all meaning?

If the theory of escalated counterattack is based on the assumption that the enemy will be allowed to advance into the heart of Western Germany before total nuclear engagement takes place, as some American military experts have envisaged, it is obviously unacceptable to Europe.

If, on the other hand, the detonator of total nuclear counterattack is to be enemy incursion a few kilometers beyond the frontier, the existence of a short interval during which an escalated counterattack would take place as proof of the allies' determination to defend themselves would doubtless be acceptable to all. It seems probable that at some time someone has tried to define this time limit. Suffice it to remember the plan for laying a minefield along the eastern frontier of the Federal Republic of Germany.

It must be emphasized that the absence of any coherent policy on the part of the Alliance in this field is an additional justification, if such were needed, for the existence of national nuclear deterrent forces.

But there are other problems that operational planning must tackle. So far as we know, there is no well-established allied policy for meeting the case of revolt by the population of East Germany. What would NATO do if confronted with such an eventuality? Ill-timed intervention could unleash a total war, but a Pontius Pilate attitude would mean the end of German membership of the Alliance.

What plans exist—and here again we come up against the problem of total counterattack or not—for parrying possible aggression on the extreme northern or the extreme southern flank of Europe, which are



well known to be inadequately provided with men and military equipment?

And could we not tackle the problems of coordinating nuclear production and research and their implications for the material organisation of the Alliance?

This list is by no means exhaustive, of course, but here is a series of problems in which the military and political aspects are intermingled, and the study, and so far as possible the solution, of which would make the Alliance infinitely more effective than the more or less hazy plans with which we are deluged and which are completely unrealistic.

(2) Parallel with the study of this series of problems, the question of the possible regionalisation of the Alliance should also be tackled.

It is obvious that some of the fifteen member countries of NATO regard their responsibilities as worldwide, while others, for geographical, demographic or political reasons have a more limited outlook. Should not each state of its own accord define its own geographical area of commitment?

It is quite possible to imagine a system whereby, while maintaining intact the complete solidarity of the fifteen within the area at present covered by the Treaty, such states as have worldwide commitments could accept more extensive responsibilities and consult together for the purpose of carrying them out in common. Would that not be the beginning of a reply to the obsessing problem raised above of equality in decision and responsibility?

There is certainly no lack of constructive work for the governments in finding solutions which would promote, quite apart from military effectiveness, increased solidarity among the member countries.

There can be no progress without movement. Progress, even at a pace that may seem slow and hesitant to Atlantic maximalists, will enable us to give the lie to the assertion I quoted at the beginning of this report, that the Atlantic Alliance has become a historical relic.

#### THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

During the past year, the Cyprus problem has remained much the same as it was when we discussed it at the last NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. The most that need be said about it is that there seems to have been a sudden change in the attitude of Soviet Russia, which supported the Greek position up to the last few months and is now moving closer to that of Turkey.

The Committee will agree, I am sure, that the solution of the Cyprus problem is essentially and solely the concern of the interested parties, the Governments in Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. Noninterference in the affairs of others and the right of the peoples to be master of their own fate must be the golden rule for all states, particularly for the NATO allies. The Committee will probably wish, therefore, merely to deplore the damage the Greco-Turkish dispute could cause to the effectiveness of the Alliance on its southeastern flank, and to express the hope that the Governments concerned will continue to seek a solution that takes account of the vital interests of the parties and the wishes of the Cypriot people.

## BERLIN AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

Here again, the past year has produced nothing particularly new. The Berlin problem and that of the division of Germany are still with us.

Clearly, the future peace of Europe and the world will depend largely on the solution found for them sooner or later.

These two closely linked problems depend for their solution on a distinctly hypothetical agreement between the four countries responsible as a result of the 1939-45 war and the agreements which followed it.

But any solution that may be devised will be of primary concern to all the countries of Europe, and it is quite unrealistic to imagine that it can be formulated without those interested having a chance to express their point of view.

However that may be, all we can do at this Conference is to note the existence of the problem, recognize that its solution must take all interests into account and in particular those of the German people, and reaffirm that the rights of the three western countries in Berlin are part of their vital interests.

## PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE AREA OF THE ALLIANCE

At the meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers on 9th May, the Secretary General of the Organisation, Mr. Manlio Brosio, said:

The real causes for anxiety are to be found outside Europe. The United States have recently sent armed forces to Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Although this is happening outside the area covered by the Alliance, the European countries cannot remain indifferent to something which concerns the largest member of the Organisation and the one on which rests so much of the responsibility for maintaining peace and freedom in the world.

We can only subscribe to that statement.

But it is not within the province of this report to undertake a critical examination of unilateral action by the United States.

I will confine myself to noting that this action has met with the most varied reception by the NATO allies, extending from unconditional support to the most explicit reservation. Similarly, outside the Alliance, among the uncommitted countries which are the least suspect of being anti-American, the reaction has, on the whole, been rather unfavourable.

This state of affairs entails two considerations which are of direct interest to the Alliance.

(1) Because for many developing countries the United States are the leaders of the western world, the governments and peoples of these countries are led to confuse—wrongly, of course, the policy of the United States with that of NATO. It is easily done, and your rapporteur has seen it happen in Black Africa, where the action of the United States in Vietnam is equated with concerted intervention by the NATO countries.

Thus, in the eyes of part at any rate of the developing world, this type of unilateral action by one member of the Alliance becomes a

war of colonial reconquest to which all the allies are committed, a mistake fostered with great diligence in certain propaganda.

(2) It is no less obvious that in the end a policy of armed intervention in a geographical area not covered by the Treaty may nevertheless, as the effect of military followed by political escalation, result in responsibility being laid at the door of all the allied countries. What we all have at the back of our minds and what we all pray will never come to pass, is the involvement of China and her ally, the U.S.S.R., in the war in Vietnam, confronting the military might of America.

But although this is a topical case, it is not the only one. Any state belonging to the Alliance which has worldwide interests is liable, by isolated action outside that Organisation's geographical area, to call Atlantic solidarity into play for its own advantage. Witness what could have happened in the Suez affair.

These findings lead us to a conclusion which strengthens still further the argument put forward in the first part of this report, that the interdependence of the free countries is such in the world of 1965, where distance no longer means anything, that coordination of their policies is imperative unless the enemy is to profit from their divisions, the uncommitted countries to misinterpret the real aim of the Alliance, and, in the final analysis, the very solidarity of the Atlantic countries to be severely tried.

Reorganizing the Alliance by making use of existing opportunities without striving after perfection; setting everything in motion for coordinating the international policy of the member states—those are the overall conclusions that your rapporteur ventures to recommend to the attention of the Conference.

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#### REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

Submitted by Captain DAVID W. GROOS, RCN., Retd., Canada, Rapporteur

At the meeting of the Military Committee in Paris in May your Rapporteur was directed by the Chairman to investigate and report on the progress of standardisation within the NATO alliance. A brief report is attached hereto, with some details giving a measure of the extent to which standardisation has been achieved. Unfortunately, because of security restrictions, this report is not sufficiently specific to give more than a bare outline. It appears, however, from such investigations as your Rapporteur has been able to conduct on his own, and from very brief informal conversations with SACEUR, that in a number of areas a generally acceptable level of standardisation has been achieved. Particularly this is so in the field of communications equipment and procedures, and in the areas of tactical doctrine and training. It is in matters of equipment, more especially the larger items of fighting equipment, that less standardisation has been accomplished than is desirable from a military point of view. The smaller nations in NATO find this state of affairs to be particularly distressing.

With a multiplicity of weaponry designed to perform the same military function, smaller individual manufacturing runs are required than if there were one type only. There is a tendency to manufacture the entire piece of equipment in one country. Consequently there is little chance for the smaller countries to participate in the manufacture

of equipment which they themselves require. It follows that the advanced technological processes which unquestionably stem from military production and which flow from the armament industry, to the eventual benefit of the entire industrial base of a nation, are thereby lost to them.

In actual fact, the smaller nations become triple losers. Military equipment must be purchased abroad, resulting in a loss of valuable foreign exchange; there is no industrial or technological benefit, and too frequently there is suspicion that the equipment acquired is second best, since many factors in addition to straight military value play large roles in the negotiations leading up to a final purchase contract.

This part of our NATO military standardisation has been a failure in spite of repeated calls by members of this Assembly for closer attention to this important matter.

It seems to your Rapporteur that standardisation in its broad sense is a true measure of our earnest intentions towards NATO.

The smaller nations are not the main offenders here. To a certain extent standardisation for them is a matter of economic necessity for, as has been pointed out, they must join with others in making most of their military equipment purchases. It is the larger nations who have the bulk of the requirements and who possess an abundance, but by no means a monopoly, of the design and manufacturing talent and who have a great deal to gain or to lose in fulfilling these needs, who must bear the larger responsibility. It is they who must be prepared to come to standardisation agreement among themselves, and who must find a way to allow the smaller nations to participate in production sharing.

This would seem to be a matter of sufficient urgency and importance to warrant a special investigation by an Ad Hoc Subcommittee of this Assembly.

In accordance with the directive of the Chairman at the May meeting, a recommendation will be included at the conclusion of this report that the NATO Defence College should include in its programme a study of the principles, the work and the effect of the German School for Military Leadership, Psychology and Morale (Schule der Bundeswehr für Innere Führung), with a view to ascertaining whether or not this type of institution should be established in other NATO countries to fulfill national needs.

This brings up a point made at the meeting in May by your Rapporteur that, because our organisation is not institutionalised, there does not exist in it any body to undertake special studies. From time to time ad hoc committees are established to undertake special tasks, as for example, the Committee now studying the possible reorganisation of NATO. In this case the study is basically a political one and as such can probably best be done in this manner. However, there are a number of military matters which come up from time to time, as for example the problem already mentioned concerning standardisation, which require considerably more time and attention for study than individual members of this Committee are perhaps able to devote to them. It is a matter for consideration whether or not the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference could establish a channel to the various Staff Colleges in the member nations so that they can



enlist the assistance of those institutions in studies which have mainly a military significance.

It must be a matter of great concern to all NATO Parliamentarians to note the air of uncertainty about the future of NATO which follows from the public statements of major political figures, indicating beyond any reasonable doubt that certain of the present arrangements under which the Military side of NATO is operating will be unacceptable in the future. Of particular significance is the threat by the President of France to withdraw France from the NATO structure in 1969. The recent remarks of the Prime Minister of Canada, in that they appear to reflect a weakening of NATO's position, may also be of interest. Speaking in Banff, Canada, in August, he told the Conference on World Development:

The NATO Alliance provides us with the best structure for collective defence in present conditions, but we now feel no real assurance that its arrangements will persist on any genuine collective basis, and we are not even sure now that they will turn out to be best for us in the long run.

It appears to your Rapporteur that there is a deep well of goodwill among the member countries of NATO which, if properly tapped, could provide through the normal channels of consultation whatever changes are necessary to satisfy the legitimate requirements of any member nation. Before this can be tested, however, it is essential that the NATO partners be advised in detail of the changes that are sought by any member nation. The uncertainty of not knowing what these are encourages wild and harmful speculation, damages the unity of NATO, and brings into question the validity of much of the discussion now going on at this Conference. If there is to be any useful discussion of military matters here, it must be in the light of the realities of the future.

Within the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, where all member nations are represented, a nation could surely find a suitable forum in which, at least, to discuss the matters in dispute, and to present its point of view. This Assembly could provide a most valuable service to NATO itself by paving the way for change. If for any reason this is not possible, perhaps the most valuable and realistic discussion we could have here would be the effect upon the remaining member nations of NATO, should one of its central members withdraw, a prospect which at the moment seems to be more than possible.

#### APPENDIX TO PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE RAPPORTEUR

##### STANDARDISATION OF EQUIPMENT—NATO COUNTRIES—REPORT OF PROGRESS

1. In April 1964, the NATO Military Committee allocated to the Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS) the task of fostering military standardisation within the NATO forces, with the aim of enabling those Forces to operate together in the most effective manner.

2. NATO military standardisation is defined as the adoption by all, or a group of NATO Nations of—

a. *In the Procedural Field*, like or similar operational, logistical and administrative procedures. This field includes such matters as tactics, organization, reports and charts. It also embraces

such special techniques such as those involved in Mine Warfare, Antisubmarine Warfare, etc.

b. *In the Material Field*, like or similar military equipment. This field includes such items as components, ammunition, supplies and stores.

3. The following subjects are not dealt with by the MAS, responsibility being held as shown below:

a. Communications: Communication Electronics Committee (CEC) of the Standing Group.

b. Intelligence: Standing Group.

c. Security: Standing Group.

d. Meteorology: Standing Group.

e. Research and Development Armaments Committee (Production, Logistics and Infrastructure Division).

4. The work of the MAS is done by three Boards, the Naval, Army, and Air Boards, respectively.

5. The Naval Board has sponsored some 100 odd Standardisation Agreements (STANAGS). Of these some 30-odd deal with the standardisation of equipment.

6. The Army Board has sponsored some 180-odd STANAGS of which some 45 deal with the standardisation of equipment.

7. The Air Board has sponsored some 300-odd STANAGS of which 150-odd deal with standardisation of equipment.

8. The Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure Division of the Armaments Committee has sponsored some 90-odd STANAGS the majority of which concern themselves with standardisation of equipment.

9. The Communications Electronics Committee (CEC) of Standing Group has sponsored some 25 STANAGS many of which concern themselves with standardisation of equipment.

10. The subject titles of individual STANAGS and detailed information as to the status of ratification and implementation by individual NATO nations is given in the NATO Publication AAP-4(H). This is a Confidential NATO Allied Administrative Publication promulgated under the auspices of MAS on an annual basis in March of each year.

11. The work of the MAS is on a continuing basis, and it is dealt with either by means of a Custodian/Correspondent relationship or by means of Working Parties such as the Army Equipment Working Party. Similar Working Parties are in existence under the aegis of MAS on behalf of the Naval and Air Boards.

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#### REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Submitted by Mr. TH. E. WESTERTEP, Netherlands, Rapporteur

#### CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The Alliance is unfortunately at present undergoing a somewhat serious crisis. The present report will be limited to drawing the attention of members of our parliamentary Conference to the problems arising in the economic sector. At the same time, your rapporteur is fully aware of the fact that difficulties in this sector, while important, are merely the product of the political-military crisis.



Although it is not incumbent on the rapporteur of the Economic Committee to direct discussion to the basic causes of the existing Atlantic crisis, he cannot overlook the fact that two conflicting concepts prevail within our Alliance; namely—

the concept of Atlantic interdependence in the political and military spheres no less than in the economic sphere, an interdependence which should lead to integrated institutional structures calculated to ensure sound operation of the Alliance;

the concept of simple cooperation between sovereign States, such cooperation to be of limited duration and to involve no institutionalisation, no integration which is regarded as a form of subordination.

Unfortunately, so long as these differing philosophies underly our alliance, it will be difficult in political practice to find any opportunity for concrete arrangements designed to solve the problems confronting the Alliance's governments. The present report deals with various major economic questions which are currently the subject of discussion within the Atlantic Alliance or, more precisely, within the Western world.

The three basic economic issues at present being discussed between our governments are as follows:

1. The progress of tariff negotiations within the framework of GATT, generally known as the "Kennedy Round".

2. The progress of the work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and its permanent body, the Trade and Development Board (TADBOARD).

3. The coordination of the Atlantic countries' trade policies with respect to countries having a State-directed trade (East-West trade).

Our Economic Committee has authorized its rapporteur to expand on these three subjects. It suggests that the Plenary Conference should adopt the recommendations appended to this report.

#### I. PROGRESS OF GATT TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS (THE KENNEDY ROUND)

It was the late President Kennedy who initiated far-reaching negotiations aimed at a substantial reduction in barriers to international trade. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act unquestionably constituted a move of the greatest importance on the part of both Congress and the President of the United States of America. For the first time in the history of the United States, this legislation authorized the American President to negotiate on a reciprocal basis a linear reduction of customs tariffs by as much as 50 percent. The origin of these negotiations, which are at present taking place in Geneva within the framework of GATT, undoubtedly lies in the establishment in Europe of a vast Common Market gradually brought into being by the European Economic Community (established by the 1957 Rome Treaty). In the face of the gradual establishment of a market comprising some 175 million consumers, the United States recognized that intensification of trade between the great American and European markets would inevitably be advantageous to the West as a whole. With a view to avoiding the major difficulties involved in traditional tariff negotiations (product by product), the Trade Expansion Act authorizes the American President to conclude agreements which, with certain exceptions, might involve a linear reduction

of as much as 50 percent. The Trade Expansion Act even includes a clause which makes provision for the possibility of eliminating customs tariffs completely for all products in which at least 80 percent of the trade is between the United States of America and the European Economic Community together. This clause was included in the Trade Expansion Act on the assumption that Great Britain and other European countries would join the EEC. It became virtually inapplicable when, in January 1963, Great Britain was refused entry into the Common Market by France. There was, moreover, some doubt in Common Market circles as to whether an Atlantic Free Trade Area could be achieved without certain minimal rules designed to prevent a distortion of competition.

What is the present position of the Kennedy Round negotiations? Your rapporteur would prefer in the first instance to answer this in respect of the technical sector and then to offer certain considerations on the political possibility of a positive culmination to the Kennedy Round.

### *I. Technical problems*

The Kennedy Round negotiations officially began in May 1964 when the Committee of GATT Ministers stated that a linear reduction of 50 percent would be accepted as a working hypothesis. Exceptions to this general rule were to be restricted to those cases where an overriding national interest justified the making of such exceptions.

The basic problems to be solved by the Geneva negotiators may be summed up as follows:

#### *A. Industrial products*

1. *The exceptions.*—Several months elapsed before the various partners were ready to submit their lists of exceptions containing products not subject to the 50-percent linear reduction. Presentation of these lists took place on 16th November 1964 and indicated which countries were ready to take part in the most important tariff negotiations since the creation of GATT, namely—

the European Economic Community (comprising the German Federal Republic, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands);

the EFTA countries (Great Britain, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland);

the United States of America, Canada, and Japan. Poland also made certain offers to negotiate.

In the spring of 1965, the various lists of exceptions were made the subject of "justification and comparison meetings." At present, they are still the subject of bilateral discussions between the partners concerned.

2. *The disparities.*—From the beginning of the Kennedy Round negotiations, the EEC felt that the disparities between the EEC customs structure and that of the United States constituted an extremely important problem. It was obvious that United States tariffs included not a few charges significantly higher than those of the EEC. If the two tariffs were to be reduced by the same percentage—e.g., 50 percent—the United States tariffs would still be more protectionist than those of the EEC. A somewhat complicated technical formula was drawn up by the EEC and is still being discussed.

3. *Nontariff and paratariff barriers.*—Both the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom consider that certain American customs laws—and more especially the American Selling Price system—hinder the importation of certain products (especially chemical products) into the United States. They have therefore submitted certain requests to their American partner with a view to obtaining modifications to these laws, more especially in regard to the estimate of import value. The Americans are currently examining the influence of the American Selling Price on imports. It is not yet possible to forecast whether a solution in this field can be found. Any change in legislation on the American Selling Price would necessitate action by the American Congress.

### *B. Agricultural products*

Significant divergencies of opinion in the agricultural sector have emerged between the EEC and the United States as to the way in which barriers to international trade in agricultural products should be eliminated. The EEC mainly emphasizes international organization of markets and consolidation of agricultural protection (through consolidation of "support amounts") whereas the United States primarily argues in favour of measures designed to guarantee access to markets. America recommends that as large a number as possible of agricultural products should be protected solely by tariff dues (the so-called fixed tariff posts). The EEC, on the other hand, favours a system which, as far as most agricultural products are concerned, is based on protection through consolidation on the support amounts.

When there was some danger that negotiations might be brought to a standstill because of these divergent opinions, the United States, while in principle standing by their position, agreed to an examination of concrete proposals.

These proposals were submitted by the grain exporting and importing countries on 17th May of this year. On this occasion, the EEC outlined a proposal for a world organization of the cereal market. This quasi-revolutionary proposal embodies four key elements—

- the establishment of a global balance between supply and demand on the world market through a policy of storage and through consultations prior to the sale of surplus stocks;

- the fixing of an international "orientation" price at a fair and profitable level;

- the consolidation of the relationship between the international orientation price and the national support amounts;

- a provision governing the sale of surplus stocks in the interests of developing countries.

If agreement could be reached on these proposals as far as cereals are concerned, negotiations on the other agricultural products would be greatly facilitated.

Offers in respect of other agricultural products should have been submitted in Geneva on 16th September. Unfortunately, as a result of its internal crisis, the EEC was not able to observe that date.

In conclusion, while there would seem to be no longer any insurmountable difficulties regarding problems in the sphere of industrial products *from the technical angle*, there is still no sign of any agreement in the Kennedy Round as far as agricultural products are concerned.

## *II. Political prospects*

By the end of the year, the Kennedy Round negotiations which raised such hopes for a marked increase in international trade may well come to a standstill because of political considerations. It is a fact that the EEC's internal crisis which developed on 30th June, 1965 likewise affects the progress of negotiations within the Kennedy Round. It is true that the EEC Commission which, under the terms of the Rome Treaty, is the body authorized to negotiate modifications in the joint tariff system of the EEC, has been instructed by the EEC Council of Ministers to undertake the Kennedy Round negotiations; it is also true that the Six have already prepared a mandate for negotiations in both the industrial and agricultural sectors; but it is also true that these mandates call for adjustments as the negotiations proceed.

Since the EEC crisis of 30th June, however, France no longer takes part—except “provisionally”—in either the meetings of the Council of Ministers or the discussions between the experts representing the Six, who, under the European Commission, should prepare the mandates to be drawn up by the Council. Unhappily, in his press conference of 9th September, the French President left no doubt as to his determination not to resume his place within the EEC Council of Ministers unless certain conditions which he imposed on his partners concerning the applications and interpretation of the Rome Treaty were duly met. The question therefore arises of whether the Kennedy Round negotiations may not soon be brought to a halt. Personally, your rapporteur would like to draw attention to the possibility of the EEC continuing the Kennedy Round negotiations which would imply that the competent EEC institutions—if necessary without the active participation of the French Government for the time being—would continue to apply the Rome Treaty. There is nothing in the text of the EEC Treaty which precludes the possibility of decisions being taken—in this field—by five members only.

The present crisis in the EEC might also, however, lead to a breakup of the European Community as it now exists. Continuation and successful completion of the Kennedy Round are therefore largely conditioned by internal developments in the Common Market.

## II. PROGRESS OF THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) AND ITS PERMANENT BODY, THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD (TADBOARD)

The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was held in Geneva in the spring of 1964. It was the developing countries which particularly desired that this meeting of the world's first tribunal in the economic sphere should be convened. These countries numbered 75 and in fact had taken up a move by the Soviet Union which, when it first voiced the wish that a world trade conference should be held, had primarily hoped to win political advantages from such a meeting between the “have” and “have-not” countries. It will be seen in due course whether or not the communists' plan proves successful.

No fewer than 120 countries took part in the 1964 Conference; all Member States of the United Nations together with those countries belonging to one of the Specialized Agencies or to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).



Virtually all the countries attending this first trade conference agreed that (a) there was an ever-increasing gulf between the rich countries and the poor countries, and (b) there was a practically uninterrupted deterioration in the terms of trade. On the other hand, there were substantial differences of opinions as to how these far-reaching problems should be solved.

The developing countries gradually came to form a group known as "the 75" which comprised practically all the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the course of the Conference, this group expressed a wide range of wishes in regard to—

- the general and specific principles which should govern international trade;

- the access of the developing countries' basic products to markets in countries with a market economy and countries with a State-directed trade;

- the preferences to be granted to processed products coming from developing countries and intended for the "rich countries";

- an increase in financial assistance and the introduction of a system to compensate for loss of revenue from exports where such losses were due to deterioration in the terms of trade.

It must be recognized that the Atlantic countries, or rather the Western countries, failed to agree on a common position for most of the above-mentioned questions.

The only field in which the Western group of 28 countries (from noncommunist Europe and North America together with Japan, Australia and New Zealand) strongly defended a common position was with reference to the body to be responsible for continuing the work begun by the first world Conference on Trade and Development.

In this important field it was finally decided by common consent between the more advanced countries and the developing countries (since the communist countries played virtually no part in reaching a compromise) that a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development would be set up as an organ of the UN General Assembly. This new institution comprises the following sections:

I. *The Conference* (UNCTAD) in which all member countries of the UN or its specialized agencies are free to participate (an arrangement which at present excludes Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Eastern Germany), is to meet at least once every three years. The next conference is planned for 1966. The conference comprises four groups of States, namely—

- the African and Asian countries together with Yugoslavia (Group A),

- the noncommunist European countries, the United States of America, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Group B),

- the Latin American countries (Group C),

- the communist countries of Eastern Europe (except for Yugoslavia) (Group D).

Those countries belonging to Groups A and C (virtually all the developing countries) have formed the "Group of 75."

Decisions by the conference will be taken by a majority of two-thirds (each State having one vote) and it will be possible to fall back on a special procedure (the setting up of a conciliation committee) when at least ten States so desire. This procedure must be requested prior to the vote and its purpose is to seek an adequate basis for the

adoption of certain recommendations of a special kind or recommendations significantly affecting the economic or financial interests of certain countries.

II. A permanent body, *the Trade and Development Board* (TADBOARD) consists of 55 countries, including eighteen from the Western Group. It meets twice a year. Voting is by simple majority although there is a provision for the same conciliation procedure as in the case of the plenary conference (as far as the Board is concerned, this procedure must be requested by at least five States).

The Board is required to set up certain specialized committees, e.g.—

- a basic products committee,
- a committee for manufactured products,
- a committee for invisible trade and finance connected with trade,
- an ocean transport committee.

The tasks of the Trade and Development Conference and Board are far-reaching. They include, *inter alia*—

- the promotion of international trade,
- the formulation of principles relating to international trade and connected problems of economic development, and appropriate policies,
- the submission of proposals designed to implement such principles and policies.

All the recommendations of the Conference and Board are submitted to the United Nations General Assembly (through the intermediary of the United Nations Economic and Social Council which, however, may not amend them). These recommendations are not legally binding on governments but the developing countries seek to induce Western governments to give an account of any followup to the recommendations.

III. The new bodies are assisted by a permanent Secretariat and a Secretary General who is appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, subject to the approval of the U.N. General Assembly. A well-known Argentine economist, *Mr. Raoul Prebisch*, was appointed Secretary General in December 1964. The location of the Headquarters of the new Secretariat has not yet been decided on. Although the Board favoured Geneva in April, this decision was changed in September. After lengthy discussions during its second session, it decided to vote a further recommendation during a special session to be held in New York on 28 October. The choice at present is between Geneva, Rome, London, Lagos, and Addis Ababa.

It may be expected that the Conference on Trade and Development and, more especially, the Trade and Development Board, (since the latter meets more frequently) will acquire an ever-increasing significance in international economic relations so long as the developing countries succeed in making reasonable use of it.

It must unfortunately be recognized that during its first two sessions the Trade and Development Board concentrated on discussing questions of procedure.

At its first session (New York, 5–30 April 1965), the Board established its Rules of Procedure, set up its permanent committees, adopted a recommendation concerning the Secretariat's Headquarters and, especially, held a lengthy discussion on the procedure to be followed



when examining the implementation of recommendations contained in the Records of the 1964 Geneva Conference.

The Board's second session (Geneva, 24 August-16 September 1965) was unfortunately also distinguished by lengthy discussions of procedural questions and, more particularly, the location of the Secretariat's Headquarters. It was not possible to vote recommendations on such fundamental questions as the adoption of a body of principles to govern international trade or steps to extend trade in basic and manufactured products, including the problem of creating preferences for the benefit of developing countries. All that was voted was a recommendation requesting governments to inform the Secretary General of the application of recommendations contained in the 1964 records. The Board intends to combine this information in the form of a report by the Secretary General and to examine it in the course of subsequent sessions.

In view of the somewhat scanty result of its first two sessions, the Board was compelled to recommend to the United Nations General Assembly that the second conference on Trade and Development should be convened in 1967 instead of 1966. It expressed the hope that this second conference would be held in one of the developing countries. The Board itself will hold two more sessions during 1966.

In your Rapporteur's view, it is important that the 29 countries of the Western Group should as far as possible harmonize the positions which they propose to adopt in both the Conference and the Board. Your Rapporteur considers that such a coordinated policy should be formulated so as to open up genuine prospects for economic and social progress, and hence for human progress, where the peoples of the developing countries are concerned. Unfortunately, the first Conference on Trade and Development (26 March-16 June 1964, Geneva) revealed that the viewpoints upheld by certain major countries in the Western Group were based on wholly conflicting economic theories and policies. France, for example, especially recommended an international organization of markets whereas the Government of the United States of America was completely opposed to tariff preferences for developing countries and rigorously in favour of maintaining the principle of nondiscrimination.

It is very much to be hoped that effective coordination within the framework of the OECD may be achieved between the Western countries and offer real prospects to the developing countries.

### III. COORDINATION OF ATLANTIC TRADE POLICIES IN RELATION TO COUNTRIES WITH A STATE DIRECTED TRADE (EAST-WEST TRADE)

At its November 1964 session, the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference already considered the coordination of trade policies of Atlantic countries in respect of countries in the Soviet Bloc. On a motion submitted by Senator Javits, the Economic Committee, followed by the plenary Conference, adopted the following recommendation:

"The Conference,

*"Recognising* that the NATO countries have agreed to, and applied, controls on trade in strategic goods with the Soviet Bloc; and

*"Recognising* that trade in nonstrategic goods is being, and will be carried on with the Soviet Bloc countries by member

countries of NATO, and that it is essential, in the interests of the security and economic strength of the NATO countries, and of their aid to the developing nations, to harmonise the trade policies of the NATO countries with regard to the Soviet Bloc;

"RECOMMENDS the formulation by NATO governments of a wise policy which may gradually result in encouraging greater trade with those Communist countries which evolve toward greater international cooperation and peaceful pursuit of their objectives; and

"RECOMMENDS FURTHER the establishment of a Code of Fair Practice in International Trade with the Soviet Bloc, including provisions for access to countries, the publication of laws, regulations and statistics, patent and copyright protection, rules on state trading and switching of procurement, reexportation, dumping and market disruption, settlement of commercial disputes, barter trade and consultation, and the establishment by the governments of the NATO countries of an organisation similar to the Coordinating Committee for the Control of the Export of Strategic Goods to the Soviet Bloc (COCOM) to supervise the implementation and operation of such a Code of Fair Practice."

It must regretfully be pointed out that, within the framework of the OECD, our countries have not succeeded in the year which has elapsed since November 1964 in agreeing on a code of good conduct in their economic and trade relations with East European countries and Communist China. On the contrary, there have been further breaches in the application of the Berne Agreement limiting the duration of credit granted to communist countries to a maximum period of five years. Certain governments—including the British government—have apparently even granted credits for as long as 12 years. It may well be asked whether it is possible in such circumstances to talk of credits or whether it would not be more appropriate to refer to investments in the economy of Soviet countries. In any case, it is somewhat surprising to see that the credit terms offered by Western countries to Communist countries are sometimes more generous than those granted to developing countries.

Your Rapporteur would agree that trade in nonstrategic products may be as much in the interests of the West as in the interest of the Eastern countries; but it is important, in his opinion, that the development of such trade should not ultimately lead to a sort of disguised policy of financial assistance to communist countries. The competition in respect of credit terms which is at present taking place between certain countries of the Alliance is extremely harmful to Western cohesion as a whole. Your Rapporteur therefore feels that the Conference should reiterate its request that Western governments agree on a code of good conduct covering their economic and trade relations with the Socialist countries. This code might subsequently be the subject of negotiations with countries having a State-directed trade.

The framework of the OECD (which groups not only a large number of European countries but also the United States, Canada and Japan), would be the most appropriate for the work required to draw up the code of good conduct. Additionally, discussions are at present taking place concerning an intensification of East-West trade within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

## REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPING NATO COUNTRIES

Submitted by Senator JACOB K. JAVITS, United States, Chairman

Since the report submitted by me to the Parliamentarians' Conference in November 1964,<sup>1</sup> there have been many encouraging developments on the Greek-Turkish Project. Much progress has been made.

The initial studies which were completed in September 1964 suggested the existence of several areas of constructive cooperation. In my visits to Greece and Turkey of November 1964 I was assured of close cooperation in the many talks with political, business, and academic leaders. The plenary session approved the project and set up the Special Committee to implement it, of which I have the honour to serve as Chairman, with Messrs. Spanorrigas of Greece and Gulek of Turkey as Vice Chairmen. Mr. Westerterp of the Netherlands was elected rapporteur.

The Project swung into high gear in the Spring of 1965, when the Ford Foundation approved a \$150,000 grant to finance the necessary research in depth and feasibility studies. Since then substantial contributions (to date totalling \$16,250) have been received from a number of American companies and foundations with a deep interest in the mutual economic development of Greece and Turkey.<sup>2</sup> In May 1965, at a breakfast meeting in Paris, attended by over 60 representatives of Turkish, Greek, United States, Canadian, and European businesses, banks and foundations, there was organised the nongovernmental International Advisory Commission on Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation.<sup>3</sup> An Executive Committee, to act for the Advisory Commission between its sessions, was also set up. The meeting, chaired by me and with Messrs. Spanorrigas and Gulek taking leading roles, was also attended by observers from international organisations and by members of the Special Committee. It was followed by a meeting at NATO headquarters of the Special Committee.

In the relatively short period of time since the end of May, major steps, both organisational and substantive, have been taken. Let me list some of these:

On the organisational side, pursuant to the mandate of the Special Committee and in consultation with Messrs. Gulek and Spanorrigas, I have designated an Executive Director and a European Director for the Project. The Executive Director is an American, Mr. Seymour J. Rubin of Washington, D.C. Mr. Rubin is a well-known lawyer with extensive economic background. He left the Department of State in 1948 to enter the private practice of law. He has since returned to the United States Government on several occasions, and in 1961-1963 served first as General Counsel of the Agency for International Development and as the U.S. Representative to the Development Assistance Committee in Paris. It is relevant to mention that he

<sup>1</sup> See NATO Parliamentarians' Conference Document G. 126, EC (64)30-DNC 4.

<sup>2</sup> All contributions are deposited with the Governmental Affairs Institute 1726 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. (a private nonprofit research organisation), which acts as the administrator of the Ford Foundation grant. These funds are set aside to finance the cost of research and administration involving the project.

<sup>3</sup> For minutes of that meeting see NATO Parliamentarians' Conference Doc. Number H 67 EC (65) 8-DNC 15, "Preparatory Meeting to the Proceedings of the International Consultative Committee on Increasing Economic Cooperation Between Greece and Turkey."

acted as the American representative on both the Greek and the Turkish consortia organised by the OECD.

The European Director is Mr. Albert Zumbiehl, who is with a prominent French company which has kindly seconded him for a period of time. He has long experience in diplomacy and business, and particularly in development financing. He knows Greece and Turkey well.

(I have appended hereto the text of both a press release which I have issued concerning these appointments, and a subsequent editorial which appeared in the Washington Post.)

Secondly, in order to provide the necessary national support and contact with the business communities, we have had several meetings with national groups. I have met personally, together with Mr. Rubin, with leaders of the American business community (led by Mr. George James and other officials of Socony-Mobil Oil Co.) for searching discussions of the Project. At our meeting of July 9, 1965, I was honoured by the presence not only of distinguished leaders of the American business community, but also of Mr. Shepherd Stone of the Ford Foundation, the Hon. Phillips Talbot, then American Assistant Secretary of State, now our Ambassador to Greece, and Mr. George Woods, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At our second discussion—progress report session, held on August 30, 1965—Mr. Zumbiehl also met members of the United States Advisory group.<sup>4</sup> We were fortunate to have with us also Mr. Herbert Gray, our Canadian member of the Special Committee.

Although my Congressional duties have prevented my leaving the United States since our Paris meeting on May 24, Mr. Rubin has visited with our UK member of the Executive Committee, Mr. Colville of Hill-Samuel Co., and with other business interests in England. Both Mr. Rubin and I have been in touch with interested business, scientific and educational groups. Finally, Messrs. Rubin and Zumbiehl, after conferring with me in Washington, and after careful preparations, have made a preliminary trip to Turkey and Greece last month to make contact with business leaders in both countries, to apprise them of progress, and to receive, at the earliest stage possible, the views of these leaders on both the organisational and the substantive aspects of our programme.

One of the main points made to them during this September 1965 trip was the necessity of coordination within Greece and Turkey. As is known, my own observations in November 1964 had shown the great good will and willingness to cooperate of responsible business elements in both countries. This good will and willingness was crystallised in the light of the progress made in organising and starting the substantive work of the Project. As a result, we are considering asking a qualified economist or administrator, in both Greece and Turkey, to act under the overall supervision of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen of the Special Committee, as a consultant to the Executive Director and European Director, to serve as a focal point for local coordination, and to give help and expert assistance to the participating business leaders.

I should here make clear that we are relying for the major effort in Greece and Turkey on the business, academic and similar groups in

<sup>4</sup> See attached list, U.S. Advisory Group Members, Greek-Turkish Project.



each of those countries. We hope to have the help at all times of the chambers of commerce, and of the industrial and agricultural financing institutions. This is also a private-enterprise effort, in that sense resembling closely the ADELA project which I had the honour to sponsor within the content of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Thus, we hope to set up a series of *ad hoc* committees, organised both nationally and internationally, which will advise and consult at all stages of our actual research or feasibility studies. Our consultants in Greece and Turkey will be able effectively to work with these committees, and to give to the business and academic leaders the kind of coordinative assistance which will clearly be needed.

I come now to the substantive aspect of our work, which has already developed along extremely interesting lines, despite the short period since our organising meeting in Paris, and the appointment in July of Messrs. Rubin and Zumbiehl.

Here there are several main topics:

*First*, we have made rapid progress in developing proposals for exploration of several of the main topics which were foreseen in the preliminary reports—tourism, agriculture and particularly joint efforts in the transport and marketing of fruits and vegetables, and the further development of the Maritsa-Evros River basin.

All of these matters were mentioned in my last report to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Further discussion has been had with a wide variety of knowledgeable persons since then—officials of the World Bank, of the American AID organisation, of the U.N. Special Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and economic experts of both Greece and Turkey. Also, Mr. Rubin has discussed prospects in these fields with private industry, with well-known consulting firms, and with a wide variety of persons possessing expert and impartial experience, including, for example, the engineering firm which originally drew up and supervised the 1953 Maritsa-Evros plan. Out of all of this has come a series of specific proposals for research and for cooperation with private and international organisations.

In regard to the Maritsa Evros study, we have been in close contact with our distinguished colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, and through him with the Thyssen and the Volkswagen Stiftungen (Foundations) in Germany. We hope in cooperation with them to be able to propose a useful and quite specific study, which will make recommendations in the fields of irrigation and of land management, as well as in such other fields of agricultural development as the study may show to be feasible. In the making of the study we expect, of course, the friendly cooperation of the Greek and the Turkish Governments.

In respect of fruits and vegetables, we have had extremely helpful conversations, promising much useful collaboration, with Mr. Paul Hoffman, Director of the United Nations Special Fund, and Mr. Paul-Marc Henry, his deputy. We have discussed with these eminent persons the projects already sponsored by the Special Fund in Greece and Turkey. We have been in touch with the Food and Agriculture Organization about its studies of problems of production, standardisation, packaging, transport and marketing of fruits and vegetables in the Eastern Mediterranean. An immediate consequence has been a visit by Messrs. Zumbiehl and Rubin to the headquarters of the FAO, a discussion of such questions as that of refrigeration, and a

real possibility of a feasibility study which would be of inestimable benefit to a mutually beneficial increase in the exports of fruits and vegetables from Greece and Turkey.

Tourism already contributes important sums to the economy of Greece, and, to a lesser but increasing extent, that of Turkey. Many studies have already been made in this field. We here propose to finance a special, preliminary study, which will take these other studies into account, will bring together in one report the ways in which a collaborative effort would benefit Greece and Turkey, and will make recommendations both for further feasibility studies and, if possible, in this preliminary report, for projects in the area of tourism. Here it is evident that governments and private interests, backed by national and international development finance institutions, must cooperate. Transport must be provided, hotels and motels must be built; roads must be improved; border formalities must be made easier; and a joint effort to advertise the cultural, religious, archeological and scenic aspects of the region—as a region—must be undertaken.

Other areas of work—such as fisheries—are also under study.

*Second*, we are taking advantage of the many offers of assistance which have come to us from the private business and academic communities to explore new areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. It is too early to say what specific projects will come out of this study. But it is already clear that there exists a vast reservoir of good will and expert knowledge and interest. This combination cannot fail, as the Project moves forward, to have measurable results. It has already resulted in a demonstration of the willingness of scholars and businessmen, as well as government officials, to work together toward the mutual benefit of the Greek and Turkish peoples.

*Third*, we have explored, with highly encouraging results, the possibility of new channels of discussion of problems of mutual interest. Thus, we have had encouragement from the great international financing institutions, the national institutions of industrial and agricultural finance, and the private business communities for a series of international conferences. These conferences would seek to bring together the interested persons, from Greece and Turkey, from Western Europe and North America, and from the international institutions, to confer on possible cooperation in a number of areas. One such area which immediately suggests itself is that of the financing of industrial development. Another is tourism, and a vitally important one is that of agricultural development and financing of such development. Conferences of this sort, looking towards the exchange of information and the setting up of a permanent channel for that exchange, could be extremely useful. Moreover, they would take a first important step toward ensuring that proposals which required financing, private, governmental or international, would have at least a part of the problem of financing solved. For there would be a mechanism to which specific plans, whether in the field of tourism, agriculture or elsewhere, could be presented.

The response to these suggestions has been so favourable that we hope, in the Spring of 1966, to have one or two such meetings. Hopefully, we would like to have them in Greece and Turkey, preferably in surroundings where formal sessions can be supplemented by quiet conversations. For understanding, rather than any formal agreements, will be the optimum outcome of such sessions as these.

In this same connection, I should say that we wish to give every encouragement to cultural and education exchanges and cooperation. We are exploring the suggestions made by Mr. Spyros Skouras, a distinguished American citizen whose benign interest encompasses both Greece and Turkey. It is possible that a special group to work on cultural cooperation could be established, in close liaison with our own Project. We may commission a study of the business and financial laws of Greece and Turkey, with the objective of a conference of leading lawyers and legal scholars to see whether cooperation here would be fruitful.

All these avenues to be explored. Some may prove to be blind alleys; but progress in the short time during which the Project has been underway is highly encouraging.

There is one final thought I would like to express. That is that on all sides we have been cautioned not to be impatient, to recognize that feasibility studies take time, that specific results will be slow, that the consequences of our efforts will be measured over a long and not a short period of time. And this advice has come to us from those who are most strong in their support of the Project.

We recognize that the results, in some senses, will show up only in some years. This has been known from the beginning. At the same time, we hope to be able to present quite specific results in a relatively short time. Some of these will be feasibility studies and recommendations. Some of these will be the establishment of better means of communication, of liaison groups, for example. Some will be the creation of ways and means of implementing study recommendations.

But the most important result is already, here and now, tangible. This is the demonstrated ability of businessmen, scholars and others from Greece and Turkey to work together, with the encouragement of this Project, toward the solution of their mutual problems of economic development. That result, as I say, is already a fact. It must be extended and made more specific. But it is clear that it exists, and that the work due until now confirms its existence.

I thus feel that we can, on the record, be pleased with the establishment of the Special Committee of which I have the honour to be Chairman. I can appropriately commend my Vice Chairmen, our esteemed colleagues, Messrs. Gulek and Spanorrigas, and the other members of the Special Committee, the Executive and European Directors, Messrs. Rubin and Zumbiehl, and I can justifiably express a certain confidence for the future.

#### CONTRIBUTIONS TO GREEK-TURKISH PROJECT

D. S. and R. N. Gettesman Foundation, \$5,000 (have pledged \$10,000), March 1965.

Arthur and Gloria Ross Foundation, \$1,000, March 1965.

U.S. Freight Company, \$2,000, April 1965, August 1965.

Socony-Mobil Oil Co., \$5,000, August 1965.

Pfizer International Inc., \$1,000, August 1965.

20th Century Fox Film Corporation, \$500, August 1965.

Trans World Airlines, \$1,500, August 1965.

Singer Company Foundation, \$250, September.

Ford Foundation, \$150,000, April 1965.

Total, September 21, 1965, \$166,250.00.

## MEMBERS OF U.S. ADVISORY GROUP FOR GREEK-TURKISH PROJECT

- Mr. John B. Arnold, Senior Vice President, First National City Bank, New York City.  
Mr. Amory Bradford, Consultant to the Ford Foundation, New York City.  
Mr. Tom B. Coughran, Executive Vice President, Bank of America, New York City.  
Mr. Arthur V. Danner, Senior Vice President, Socony-Mobil Oil Company, Inc., New York City.  
Mr. Richard C. Fenton, President, Pfizer International, Inc., New York City.  
Mr. Morris Forgash, President, U.S. Freight Company, New York City.  
Mr. George F. James, Senior Vice President, Socony-Mobil Oil Company, New York City.  
Mr. Henry W. Manville, Vice President, The Singer Company, New York City.  
Mr. Robert R. Mathews, Senior Vice President, American Express Company, New York City.  
Mr. H. L. Nathan, Vice President, Parsons and Whittemore, Inc., New York City.  
Mr. Arthur Ross, Executive Vice President and Managing Director, Central National Corporation, New York City.  
Mr. Francis X. Scafuoro, Vice President, Bank of America, New York City.  
Mr. Spyros Skouras, Chairman of the Board, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, New York City.  
Mr. Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr., President, Trans World Airlines, New York City.  
Admiral John M. Will (USN, Ret.), President and Chairman of the Board, American Export and Isbrandtsen Lines, New York City.  
Mr. Sidney H. Willner, Vice President and General Counsel, Hilton Hotels International, New York City.
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## REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

Submitted by Mr. G. MUNDELEER, Belgium, Rapporteur

During the present session, the Scientific and Technical Committee continued its study of the questions to which it gave preliminary consideration at its meeting on 28th May this year.

At the conclusion of its work, the Committee adopted, on 6th October, three Recommendations for submission to the Conference.

## PREPARATORY WORK

- Progress Report on NATO Science Activities: Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Scientific Affairs, Mr. J. McLucas (United States).  
Parameters of Space Law; Present and Future: Andrew G. Haley, General Counsel, International Astronautical Federation.  
NATO Fisheries in the North Atlantic and their Future: Mr. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (United States).



North Atlantic Fishing Technology: Mr. Milan Kravanja, Foreign Fisheries Specialist, Bureau of Commerical Fisheries, U.S. Department of the Interior.

Research on International Conflict: Report submitted by Mr. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (United States).

By 1966, it will be ten years since our Conference decided to set up a Scientific and Technical Committee, designed to examine means of stimulating study and of putting scientific discoveries to a practical use.

Through reports and recommendations unanimously adopted by the Conference, it has undoubtedly contributed efficiently to the scientific progress of the community. By encouraging the development of national programmes as well as cooperation between the member countries, in each of which the training of scientists and engineers has been stepped up, it has contributed towards making the best use of their scientific and technical skills.

Thus, NATO's work in reinforcing and supplementing national scientific programmes is the direct consequence of the action taken by our Conference on the recommendations of its Scientific and Technical Committee.

On the eve of the tenth anniversary of its institution, I am glad to be able to emphasize that point and to have this opportunity of congratulating Professor Portmann, Senator for the Gironde, who has presided and is still presiding over our Working Party with an authority and a competence that everyone gladly acknowledges.

Last year, Mr. McLucas, our Assistant Secretary General, reported on the scientific and technical activities of NATO expenditure which had amounted to \$4 million, of which \$2.5 million were earmarked for scholarships, \$650,000 were spent on grants to European study institutes and nearly \$1 million on military research.

Again this year, various scientific and research scholarships have been awarded and the Advanced Research Institute has continued its valuable work. The Scientific Adviser and the Scientific Advisory Committee also continue to prove of great assistance to the NATO Council.

In addition, the Committee of Defence Research Directors (D.R.D.), established in April 1964, considers relations between civilians and the military authorities and is also responsible for keeping up to date the "Von Karman Reports," their author having foreseen the inevitable effects of the constant development of technology on defence requirements.

As Senator Jackson stated in 1960, "NATO's scientific programme is a working proposition" and the work done at the present session will have demonstrated the truth of the statement to those who have attended it. It has been in no way inferior to that done in previous years, the usefulness of which is a matter of record.

It is unnecessary to recall that our Committee has successively considered such questions as, in 1961, the possible establishment of a Scientific and Research Institute, in 1962 the establishment of a NATO Meteorological Centre, in 1963 the problems of water shortage, and in 1964 that of the physical and chemical pollution of water, air and food.

The agenda for this session included "oceanographical studies," an inquiry directed towards preserving and discovering the new food resources which are essential to humanity. It has always been our

aim, through NATO, a defensive military alliance, to encourage any action likely to improve not only man's living conditions and chances of survival, but also his dignity as a human being.

How best to keep the public informed, in connection with a possible nuclear war, the search for appropriate means to ensure the protection of the civilian population and, finally, the study of human sciences and the origin of conflicts have always been in the forefront of our minds in this connection.

We are glad to note that every project put forward by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference's Scientific and Technical Committee has been both taken under advisement by the governments of the member countries and also partly carried out already. The use of Tiros satellites in the fields of communication and meteorology bear witness to that fact. Furthermore, the favourable reaction to our reports on water desalination, the agreements reached between the United States and Russia, the 58-nation symposium presently meeting in Washington to examine this vital problem, and the legislation recently passed by the American Congress are eloquent testimonials to the value of our advice.

We cannot disregard the fabulous development of modern techniques. We need to be constantly aware of them and retain full control over them if we do not want to run the risk of seeing our planet destroyed.

Finally, in view of the constant increase in the population, we must of all necessity and urgency seek solutions to the "Hunger" and "Water Shortage" problems.

In a paper attached to this report, prepared in cooperation with Mr. Steyaert, the distinguished scientist from the *Institut Royal des Sciences Naturelles de Belgique* who himself takes part in NATO's oceanographical expeditions, we recommend that the Organization provide additional support for the oceanographical studies now underway. Those studies will enable us to improve our meteorology in the same way that the study of the origin of the fathomless waters of the Atlantic will undoubtedly provide a solution to the problems of how to deposit radioactive waste on the sea floor without endangering human life.

The study of the various strata of water, from the surface down to the very bottom, is essential to a full knowledge of the possibilities of submarine detection.

Since pictures taken from satellites are inadequate because of the unpredictable interference from cloud, the safety of polar navigation also requires the study of the physical properties of ice.

The efforts of scientists now experimenting with the industrial use of tide and wave-produced energy (tidal plant) also deserve encouragement.

Finally, the nutritive resources to be found in the oceans should be developed in a more rational manner.

During a visit to various NATO bases in Europe, several of our colleagues had an opportunity of visiting the fine Centre of Oceanographical Studies and Research at Spezia. Mr. Rodino, a member of the U.S. Congress, and one of our most valuable colleagues, has put in a report on fishing conditions in the Atlantic in which he suggests that every effort be made to ensure that this important

industry benefits from current scientific and technical progress. In this connection, Mr. Milan Kravanja, an expert on foreign fisheries attached to the United States Department of the Interior, made a most valuable and interesting statement on the organisation of fisheries in Soviet Russia.

According to the available statistics, the number of Soviet fishing days in the Northwest Atlantic rose from 2,500 in 1956 to 32,000 in 1963. This is coupled to the fact that, in our Atlantic Ocean, Russia is now one of the countries using the most advanced techniques which is automatically resulting in a considerable increase in the size of its catches. Since Portugal has long taken a special interest in this matter, into which she has conducted a certain amount of research, NATO should logically take into account the results already achieved by starting its investigations with the Portuguese fisheries.

These two statements showed us that, despite the many thousand years during which we have lived beside them, the seven seas and the wealth they contain, are as little known to us as the cosmic space man is seeking to penetrate today.

NATO is centred on the Atlantic and it is surely for NATO to use every possible means to promote a better use of the sea. It is to be hoped that the naval authorities of every member country will put themselves at the disposal of the scientists and arrange for the construction of special oceanographic ships, capable of using the most up-to-date techniques.

Once again, through their wise cooperation, member countries have an opportunity of undertaking a great task that has been long overdue. The stake is a vital one, being nothing less than the survival of humanity.

Finally, Mr. A. G. Haley, General Counsel of the International Astronautical Federation, has analysed the effects of the conquest of space by man in the fields of science, technology, and law. He emphasized particularly the legal conditions of space occupation by the various countries, as well as its consequences from the point of view of the defence of the various nations of the world and the use of space for scientific and peaceful purposes. The time may be near when all our traditional assumptions will be completely overturned. This Committee is fully alive to the problems which will be confronting our jurists and scientists in the near future and which will include the reactions and the means of communication of the human brain, as well as the existence of life outside this planet. Once again, an immense field of investigation is opening out before man's questioning spirit.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

*The first Recommendation* reaffirms the Committee's recognition of the need for continued technological cooperation in the important field of Oceanographic Research.

*The second Recommendation* evolved in view of the dangers of the threatening depletion of the North Atlantic fishery resources, and the need for closer technological cooperation among the NATO nations.

*The third Recommendation* is the result of the Committee's recognition of the need for regulation of man's activities as he enters the new realm of space.

The following Committee Officers were elected unanimously:

Chairman: Professor Georges Portmann (France).

Vice Chairman: Mr. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (United States).

Rapporteur: Mr. Georges Mundeeler (Belgium).

#### APPENDIX TO THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE REPORT

##### UNABRIDGED DETAILS AND REFERENCES OF RECOMMENDATION III

The Committee,

*Believing* that resolution of the problem of the demarcation of an upper limit upon the sovereignty of states is a matter requiring immediate attention in view of the fact that it is essential for the interpretation and enforcement of many international treaties and of thousands of national laws, both civil and criminal, to establish the jurisdictional parameters of "airspace" as distinguished from "outer space," and

*Believing* that this matter is one deserving the attention of all states in order that an acceptable and reasonable solution of the problem may be attained through cooperation and agreement among the states of the world, and in particular the NATO nations, and

*Mindful* of the resolutions of the International Law Association calling attention to the divergent regimes of law applicable in the "airspace" and in "outer space" (Forty-eighth Conference, New York, 1958), requesting study of the question of defining the lower limits of outer space (Forty-ninth Conference, Hamburg, 1960), requesting the creation of a special body to study such problems (Fiftieth Conference, Brussels, 1962), and "recognizing the importance of the problems of the upper limit of national space and the right of innocent passage of foreign spacecraft through such space" (Fifty-first Conference, Tokyo, 1964), and

*Mindful* of the Draft Code and Rules of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (United Kingdom) providing for an upper limit on "airspace" at 80,000 meters (50 miles), and

*Mindful* of the inclusion of draft provisions for limitations upon national sovereignty in other proposals for international agreements relating to space, such as the Tentative provisions for International Agreements of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and

*Mindful* of the distinction made between "airspace" and "outer space" in the Magna Carta of Space adopted at the Fourteenth Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association (San Juan, 1965), and

*Considering* the practice of the International Aeronautical Federation limiting at an altitude of 100 kilometers any awards for records set in "flight," meaning powered flight in the airspace, and

*Considering* the regulations of the Air Force of the United States which provide that the pilot of a vehicle in powered flight above an altitude of 50 miles is an astronaut, and

*Mindful* of Dr. Theodore von Karman's findings that at the altitude of about 50 miles atoms of the air dissociate and molecular construction ends so that atmospheric pressure ends, and

*Mindful* of Dr. von Karman's determination that at about 50 miles altitude the regime of Kepler force commences and at this point arti-



facts in space must rely upon centrifugal force and not aerodynamic lift to remain in flight, and

*Mindful* of the commencement of the regime of exobiology at an altitude of approximately 50 miles, and

*Considering* that no formal statement of opposition to the resolution of the problem of demarcation of the upper limit of national sovereignty has ever been registered by a state or international organization,

*Recommends* to the NATO nations that international agreement be sought in the matter of the demarcation of the upper limit of national sovereignty, and

*Commends* to all states for their consideration in formulating such agreement, the Von Karman Primary Jurisdictional Boundary, on a median curve of about 90 to 100 kilometers altitude as the only logical, scientifically justifiable, and acceptable demarcation line, the acceptance of which would be consonant with existing practices of states and international organizations, as well as in harmony with the physical rules of aerodynamic flight as evaluated and set forth by Dr. Theodore von Karman.

#### REPORT OF THE CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION COMMITTEE

Submitted by Mr. ROBERT-ANDRÉ VIVIEN, France, Rapporteur

When the Committee met in Paris last May, it decided to try to promote joint Atlantic action in the cultural and information fields on the basis of the following:

Bilateral or multilateral relations enabling the NATO countries to learn to know each other's cultures by pooling information;

Coordinating action by the NATO or other similar authorities for the dissemination of national cultures and the Atlantic ideal;

Bilateral or multilateral action by the member countries vis-à-vis the uncommitted countries for the dissemination of the Western culture on which NATO is in fact founded;

Coordination and promotion of the Atlantic ideal at cultural level by the NATO or other similar authorities among the uncommitted countries.

The origin of the above suggestions is to be found in the apparent paradox that, in the sphere of culture, the only condition on which the Atlantic ideal can remain one and indivisible is that the varied nature of all the different national cultures be recognised and that they one and all be freely disseminated.

Before proceeding along these lines, it was necessary to assess what was being done at both international and national level, if the various tasks were to be satisfactorily apportioned, joint activities stimulated in certain fields, and duplication avoided.

The four recommendations adopted by the Committee are the result of the work done during its five meetings on 4th, 5th, and 6th October 1965.

Referring to the work done by the NATO countries in the cultural field, the Rapporteur made the following points:

The reorganisation of NATO can be considered from a number of aspects. Militarily speaking, it is undeniable that the Organization is, to some extent, out of date. That is inevitable, however, given the way in which strategy and materials have evolved over the past

sixteen years, as well as the changes that have taken place in the general situation and political regimes of the various member countries. A certain amount of alteration and reorganisation has become imperative. But it does not follow from that, as some would seem to fear, that NATO's powers need to be restricted. There are a number of fields in which its powers ought, on the contrary, to be increased and one of these may well be that of culture and information which, more than any other, offers a real possibility of achieving a joint policy. This is a field in which no question of supranationality or integration can arise, and this Committee's earlier Rapporteurs have all been unanimous that the matters with which we deal are precisely those in respect of which the variety of national views actually provides an element of strength and cohesion. The independent development of national cultures and the influence these exert lies at the very foundation of the concept of the freedom of nations and it is all these multiple aspects of our respective national civilisations that together form the intangible, and yet unmistakable, whole that our friends and enemies in the outside world mean when they talk, sometimes with a shade of envy, of Atlantic civilisation.

The Cultural Affairs and Information Committee has an important part to play in giving a living meaning to this concept. The Committee provides a more valuable forum than ministerial or official meetings for the exchange of ideas between men and women who are in daily contact with the living elements in their national civilisations. My object in giving the summary that will be found below—which is based on the answers to a questionnaire sent out this summer—has been to establish exactly what that part should be, by delimiting it and by laying down the broad lines of possible future action. I am extremely grateful to those of my colleagues who, by replying to the questionnaire, have shown the value they attach to the Committee's work.

Lack of time, and the fact that the questionnaire did not go out until somewhat late, have prevented the information collected from being as detailed as might be wished. More work on the same lines will need to be done in future, and it might be useful if each representative were to present a similar annual report to the Committee, setting out his own country's current cultural activities.

#### I. LINKS BETWEEN NATO COUNTRIES

It appeared from the replies that an Atlantic cultural community was undoubtedly in course of being created. There is no member country that has not established permanent official, or semiofficial relations in this field with its cosignatories.

##### A. *Official activities*

1. The replies received from the *United Kingdom* implied that these were fullest in that country.

Lord Willis and Mr. Philip Goodhart, M.P., both indicate in their replies that the United Kingdom has signed cultural agreements with 10 out of its 14 cosignatories, the only countries with which it has no cultural cooperation treaty being Canada,

Denmark, Ireland, and the United States. It is probable, however, that the lack of written arrangements in these cases is more than made up for by traditional ones.

The replies received from Senator Mundt, Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Paul Findley, relating to the *United States*, show that that country also has a complete network of cultural relations with the other member States. Exchanges of students and young workers, as well as of cultural programmes, are arranged by a variety of American services and by associations enjoying official support. The Fulbright Fellowships and the American Cultural Centres, despite the recent reduction in the number of the latter, are two valuable methods of spreading American culture among the other members of the Alliance.

*Luxembourg* has signed cultural agreements with Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These agreements cover most types of exchange mentioned in the questionnaire.

The French Government has concluded bilateral agreements with all the NATO States, except Iceland and Portugal. Such agreements provide a useful framework for exchanges between France and her partners, but they are not indispensable, as witness the close cultural relations existing with Portugal.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting through the Cultural Affairs department and the *Association pour le développement des échanges culturels*, is responsible for arranging exchanges of students and schoolchildren, and for promoting exchanges in the artistic field as a whole, as well as for maintaining the various French institutions abroad. The arrangements for visits to France by foreign students and the selection of French students for visits abroad are in the hands of the Minister of Education, while the Minister of Cultural Affairs is responsible for exchanges in the artistic field.

The Secretariat for Youth and Sport deals with leisure pursuits and holiday camps, with particular reference to European countries. A special Youth Committee has been established in connection with the Franco-German Treaty and this has enabled meetings to be organised between young people from the two countries. The Committee has met with a degree of success that would seem to warrant the creation of similar bodies in connection with other countries as well.

#### *B. Activities of private organisations*

It is the custom in Anglo-Saxon countries for the government to provide the first impetus in the case of cultural activities and then to entrust their further promotion to various private bodies. The method has the advantage of associating the citizens of the country in question with activities that are of value to the nation as a whole and is one that might well be developed elsewhere.

When compared with the work they do in the English-speaking countries, the activities of private bodies elsewhere appear somewhat insignificant, despite the valuable work done by the dedicated few who seem particularly rare in *Luxembourg*, where the only associations whose activities are on at all a wide scale would appear to be the specifically Atlantic ones.

## II. THE DEFENCE OF NATO PRINCIPLES

Action is being carried on simultaneously on three fronts by international agencies, by private associations and by governments acting upon recommendations of the Conference.

*A. International agencies*

The activities of the NATO Information Service and of the Atlantic Institute have been reviewed in separate progress reports. The valuable work done by those two bodies should, however, be emphasised. The former, which provides a veritable public relations service for the Alliance, has influenced various sectors of public opinion in NATO countries. The latter continues to promote research in very many fields related to the existence of the Alliance and receives support and grants from many countries.

A noteworthy development, born of a recommendation of the Cultural Affairs Committee, is the Atlantic Information Centre for members of the teaching profession. The aim of this Centre, established in 1963, is to provide refresher courses for European and North American teachers of modern history and geography, chiefly from secondary schools. It is a coordinating body which provides information on teaching methods used, on documentation available and on other teaching aids in connection with those subjects in NATO countries.

*B. Action within individual countries*

It seems that the wish to promote the Atlantic idea is particularly keen in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Particularly noteworthy, in this respect, is the enthusiasm shown in the United States by Mr. Paul Findley who, in a letter to the President of the United States, set out clearly the reasons which make it essential to create a genuine Atlantic nations community. Although such an ambitious project cannot be achieved in short order, efforts to this end remain indispensable. On his return from a mission in France, Mr. Findley submitted a report to Congress which explicitly and outspokenly outlines the basic requirements of a reactivated Atlantic Community.

In Great Britain, public and private efforts play a very important role in the support and defence of the Atlantic idea. Regular assistance is provided by the Government to the British section of the Atlantic Treaty Association. There are, in addition, other very active associations, such as the European Atlantic Movement and the European-Atlantic Group.

In Luxembourg, there are two private associations, the Luxembourg United Nations Association and the Atlantic Committee, which hold public meetings to promote Atlantic Alliance principles throughout the country.

In France, there exists one specifically "Atlantic" group known as the Association française pour la Communauté atlantique (AFCA), which is a member of the International Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). While its chief aim is to make NATO principles and purposes better known in France, it also strives to foster mutual understanding and knowledge between the member States by means of cultural contacts.



*C. Action taken on recommendations by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference*

Replies received show that the recommendations adopted at the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, especially on cultural matters, are not being adequately considered by the various governments. In international matters, it is obviously difficult to secure prompt and unanimous agreement on any given subject, between the various countries concerned. However, the degree of unanimity reached every year on the subject discussed demonstrates the possibility of proceeding farther and faster than is conceivable in the traditionally cautious world of the embassies. Our Conference should demand closer attention to what is said here, and more frequent implementation of its recommendations.

*D. The Atlantic countries and the uncommitted countries*

It has already been emphasised that the prestige of the Atlantic Alliance among the uncommitted countries depends essentially upon the amount of assistance granted by each member State to the countries it has decided to help. This diversifying of our efforts may well allow greater flexibility and efficiency in matters of policy, but should not exclude coordination and harmonisation. In the course of his last press conference, General de Gaulle referred to the dual necessity of individual and concerted action.

The contribution made by France is hence a comparatively substantial one, representing as it does 1.6 percent of her national revenue. Many other countries have, however, made a comparable effort. The contributions in money and manpower made by the member countries, when added together, come to a large total and if their individual actions were harmonised it might well eliminate duplication and hence enable action to be taken on a wider scale still.

With a view to expanding its work at the next session and keeping its information up to date, the Committee hopes that each of the member countries will find it possible to prepare a full report on its activities in the cultural and information spheres. The foretaste of such information collected this year shows that existing public and private bodies all have quite definite tasks which it would be possible to coordinate.

The NATO Information Service is primarily the public relations branch of the Organisation and could, owing to its general character, become a valuable channel of information for enabling the member States to coordinate their cultural exchange policies.

The Atlantic Institute which might be described as a joint laboratory for research into cultural matters whose long-term mandate is to formulate the common principles of an Atlantic civilization. It would be a mistake today to present this as intimately linked to the Alliance because the latter's essentially military character tends at first to rebuff inquirers. The Institute should stress the fact that NATO can only answer the challenge presented by the monolithic culture of the communist world by fostering an alliance between different cultures and encouraging their interpenetration, in other words, by means of the cultural freedom of its member States.

The research carried out by the Institute must be for the benefit of the various States and not be used as a direct means of propaganda if the misgivings expressed in certain quarters are to be disposed of.

The Cultural Affairs Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference can be responsible for the preliminary sorting and analysis of the data supplied to it. As its members are all concerned in the political life of their countries, it is in a position to bring about preliminary agreements between the various national representatives, and so give a certain weight to any joint recommendations its members might address, on its behalf, to their respective governments and whose implementation it would subsequently be the duty of those members to oversee.

The Committee expresses the hope that:

The authorities in each country, while freely pursuing their own national cultural policies, will take into account, in connection with their own activities, the information, research and ideas communicated to them which will be based on the data received from the NATO Information Service, the Atlantic Institute and the various associations, as well as on the reflections of the Committee itself.

Private associations will establish the necessary liaison with the public.

In the absence of any arrangement of this kind, our present endeavours will remain limited in scope and will still fail to improve the cohesion of the free world. The task before us is an arduous one.

The Committee listened to a summary by Count Adelmann, Director of the Information Service of NATO, of the activities of his service for the preceding year. He stressed the special orientation of this activity towards education and youth; in addition, significant parts of its efforts were addressed to other groups such as women's organizations, military and professional groups. The discussion brought out the rather small size of the budget made available for these efforts—only \$700,000 per year. In view of this, Count Adelmann was specially grateful for the cooperation given him by the Information Services of the NATO countries.

The Committee was also addressed by a series of educators and heads of organisations which are carrying on significant educational and research efforts. Mr. Tom Carter and Mr. Kurt Hahn spoke of the Atlantic College in Wales, and what it has already achieved in only three years of its existence. However, the aim was to create six such colleges, all offering a unique type of international education to youths from 16 to 18. M. Alexandre Marc presented the aims of an institute for higher political studies at the University of Nice which would, it was hoped, offer advanced Atlantic studies.

Ambassador Walter C. Dowling, Director General of the Atlantic Institute, outlined the varied programmes and projects in the study of Atlantic problems now developing in that institute.

General Bethouart stressed the very great importance of international youth exchanges, particularly for students, and advocated a new "Marshall Plan for Youth." He urged that such exchange programmes should include a wide variety of groups, students in the various professional fields as well as workers and farmers. The substantial exchange programme carried out by France and Germany under their joint agreement was having encouraging results. He felt that only through the young generation could the Atlantic Alliance achieve the maximum cohesion and duration.

The Committee's discussion focussed on several main themes which were also embodied in the resolutions and recommendations before it.

It showed concern over the need to achieve greater uniformity of educational standards in order to make it easier for youth to receive some education in NATO countries other than their own. A second theme was the development of the NATO information service and those of the member countries in spreading knowledge of NATO and its work. Among the various resolutions was a broad one by M. Comte-Offenbach, which the Committee adopted, calling for annual reports by the member nations on all their cultural activities, both national and international and on those of the NATO organisation itself.

A third theme of the discussions was the extension and improvement of the training of teachers in subjects relevant to the Atlantic area and its problems. To this end, the Committee indicated its interest in fostering more studies at university level on Atlantic subjects, in particular at the international institutions.

At the end of the session, Mr. Pohler proposed the reelection of Senator Mundt as President of the Committee. On the proposal of Lady Elliot, Mr. Pohler was unanimously reelected Vice President and Mr. Vivien unanimously reappointed Rapporteur.

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## PART II—RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### POLITICAL COMMITTEE

#### RESOLUTION I

The Conference,

*Reaffirms* that inasmuch as the Allied presence guarantees to the people of Berlin the exercise of their democratic freedoms and of their right to choose freely their own destiny, it is essential to preserve the western powers' rights in Berlin, which rights derive from a freely negotiated treaty;

*Believes* that the solution of the problem of Germany is essential to the future of peace;

*Recalls* that that problem is the responsibility of the four nations which took it over in 1945, but that it cannot be solved at the expense of the German people's right to choose their own destiny and to preserve their basic freedoms.

#### RESOLUTION II

The Conference,

*Asserting* the right of peoples to choose their own destiny;

*Faithful* to the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of independent nations;

TRUSTS in the common sense of the Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish governments to seek a settlement of this problem in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, which would be acceptable to all concerned and especially to the people of Cyprus.

#### RESOLUTION III

The Conference,

*Recalling* the terms of Recommendation I from the Political Committee adopted by the Tenth Annual Conference;

*Regretting* the lack of progress in creating an Atlantic Consultative Assembly;

INSTRUCTS the Political Committee to prepare a report on the possibility of converting the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a Consultative Assembly of NATO, in an official relationship to the North Atlantic Council.

URGES all NATO Parliaments to consider the conditions of a possible improvement of the status and the efficiency of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.

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### POLITICAL COMMITTEE

#### RECOMMENDATION I

The Conference,

*Believing* that, in the present world situation, there is still need for close solidarity between the nations bound together by common interests and ideals, such solidarity at present taking the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;

*Considers* that the strength of the Alliance is directly dependent upon the efforts naturally sufficiently combined, coordinated and integrated, which each of the member nations agrees to make in the service of such solidarity;

*Considers* further that true solidarity must assert itself by implementing ever more strongly, in deeds, respect for the principle of equal rights of the nations;

*Considers* also that the balance in the Alliance can only be established by the internal association of the North American and European Forces;

*Considers*, moreover, that the solidarity of the free peoples must extend beyond the geographical area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;

URGES NATO Governments to keep up their efforts to solve the problems of the coordination of their policies and their forces, a condition necessary to the development of a common military philosophy;

RECOMMENDS further that special attention be paid immediately to the problems of political and operational planning.

#### RECOMMENDATION II

The Conference,

*Approves* the existing military organisation of NATO and proposes that discussions be continued in the NATO Council on whether any changes are required in the basic allocation of responsibilities and burdens within NATO in the light of the changes in the political and strategic situation which have developed since the establishment of the NATO Alliance.

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### MILITARY COMMITTEE

#### RESOLUTION

The Conference,

*Considering* that the attainment of standardisation of military equipment for the purpose of securing maximum military efficiency provides a true measure of the earnestness of the members of the Alliance towards its purposes of common defence and mutual assistance,



*Considering* that, although substantial progress has been made with respect to the standardisation of procedures and of certain minor but important items of military equipment, greater results could well be achieved on major projects,

*Recalling* the numerous recommendations made by this Conference in the past on this subject and by other interested organisations, notably Western European Union,

*Acknowledging* the complexity of the problems involved,

*Commending* the work of the NATO Military Agency for Standardisation, and of other NATO bodies concerned with this problem,

WELCOMES the bilateral and multilateral co-ordination in research, development and production that has taken place and is increasing between members of the Alliance;

REAFFIRMS its conviction that more must be done to combine the military, industrial, and political resources of the Alliance for mutual benefit rather than to engage in mutual competition and unco-ordinated defence programmes;

RESOLVES that the subject be referred to a special committee of NATO Parliamentarians which will submit its conclusions to the Conference at their plenary session in 1966.

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### MILITARY COMMITTEE

#### RECOMMENDATION I

The Conference,

*Recognising* the progress made by member nations in the field of common production of certain military and ancillary equipment;

RECOMMENDS that member nations should take further steps to discover the most promising fields for common production, with a view to spreading defence production more equitably.

#### RECOMMENDATION II

The Conference,

RECOMMENDS that the NATO Defence College should include in its programme a study of the principles, the work and the effect of the German School for Military Leadership, Psychology and Morale and the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, and of similar institutions within the Alliance.

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### MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMITTEES

#### RESOLUTION

The Conference,

*Having heard* the rapporteur of the Working Party of the Political Committee for the Reform of NATO;

*After an extensive discussion* of a first preliminary report on the matter;

*Considering* the critical situation in which NATO finds itself at the present time;

*Conscious* of the imperative necessity of putting an end to this situation long before the coming into force of Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

INSTRUCTS the Working Party of the Political Committee to submit its final report at the annual plenary session of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to be held in the autumn of 1966, at the latest.

## ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

### RECOMMENDATION I

#### (Kennedy Round)

The Conference,

*Underlining* the great importance of a positive outcome of the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations for the increase of international trade both between developed countries and between these countries and the developing countries;

*Noting* that the Kennedy Round negotiations have made real progress in the technical field of the negotiations within the framework of GATT;

*Aware* of the fact that the present crisis within the European Economic Community might endanger the eventual success of the Kennedy Round;

RECOMMENDS that the parties involved in the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations—especially the competent institutions of the European Community—take all possible steps to overcome the present political and technical difficulties and try to conclude the Kennedy Round as scheduled before July 1st, 1967;

FURTHER RECOMMENDS that, when the negotiations under the Kennedy Round have been completed, further efforts should be made to increase trade between NATO countries.

### RECOMMENDATION II

#### (Coordination of the Policies at UNCTAD)

The Conference,

*Noting* the creation, desired by a great number of developing countries, of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD);

*Bearing in mind* that UNCTAD and its permanent organ the Trade and Development Board may become an important forum for discussions of the international economic relations between the Western developed countries and the developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America;

*Having noticed* the desire of the developing countries that UNCTAD and its subsidiary organs become an overall institution for discussing and negotiating agreements in the field of trade and financing and the desire of the Western countries that UNCTAD may not overlap the very useful work done after World War II until now by such institutions as GATT;

RECOMMENDS that the governments of the Western countries should coordinate within the framework of the OECD to the fullest extent possible their trade and finance policies towards developing countries;

RECOMMENDS FURTHER that this coordinated policy of the Western countries will be formulated in such a way that it opens real possi-

bilities for economic and social progress for the developing countries by a large extension of trade and financial assistance while preserving at the same time the existing international bodies in the field of trade so that they can continue their work in a well understood interest of both developed and developing countries.

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## SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPING NATO COUNTRIES

### RESOLUTION

The Conference,

*Recognising* the efforts of the Working Group of the Economic Committee of the Conference set up to study and make recommendations on action which should be taken to accelerate the development of the less developed countries within the Atlantic Alliance authorised by Recommendation V approved by the Ninth Annual Conference,

*Recognising* also the progress that has already been made by the Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries in its work on the Greek/Turkish project,

RECOMMENDS that further authority be given to the Special Committee to continue its work and in particular to take the following measures—

(a) to set up working parties with representatives from Greece and Turkey of private enterprise and of technical and engineering institutes covering the specific projects being undertaken by the Special Committee;

(b) to give authority to the working parties respectively to conduct seminars and meetings on the business, financial and legal aspects of economic development and on tourism;

(c) to develop national committees under the International Advisory Commission; and

(d) to take such other actions in respect of staff, meetings, studies and communications as may be appropriate in pursuance of its objectives as specified in its terms of reference.

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## SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

### RECOMMENDATION I

The Conference,

*Noting* generally the inadequacy of technical and human resources existing in several member nations as regards oceanographic work,

*Noting* that the development of such equipment is particularly important from the strategic standpoint,

RECOMMENDS that member nations cooperate in the development of the essential research equipment;

REQUESTS FURTHER that the national navies of each of the member nations assist researchers to the maximum of their abilities.

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### RECOMMENDATION II

The Conference,

*Recognising* the urgent need for modernisation of the fishing vessels of several of the NATO nations, and

*Concerned* with the increasing fishing effort of the NATO nations, and the value of coordinated fishing policies of all members;

*Recognising* the important joint efforts of other existing international bodies in the fisheries field;

RECOMMENDS that the NATO organisation takes action to provide coordinated assistance in the field of advanced fishing technology; including the specific provision for aid in the design and construction of the most modern fishing vessels;

RECOMMENDS FURTHER that NATO nations, individually, give continued and added support to the work of the OECD, the ICNEAF, the ICNAF and the ICES in the field of fisheries. (See note.)

NOTE.—

ICNEAF—International Commission for Northeast Atlantic Fisheries.

ICNAF—International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

ICES—International Council for the Exploration of the Seas.

OECD—Organisation for European Cooperation and Development.

### RECOMMENDATION III

The Conference,

*Recognising* the need for defining the boundary between the upper limits of the sovereignty of states, and the lower limits of outer space; and

*In view of existing* practices of state and international organisations, and in consonance with the physical rules of aerodynamic flight;

RECOMMENDS that NATO endeavours to reach international agreement relative to the demarcation of such limits along the "Van Karman Primary Jurisdictional Line" (on a median curve of 90 to 100 km) as the only logical scientifically justifiable and acceptable boundary.

## CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION COMMITTEE

### RECOMMENDATION I

The Conference,

*Recalling* its Recommendation of 1964 which called on education authorities and institutions of higher education in member countries to accomplish the equivalence of university entrance requirements, periods of university study, and university diplomas,

NOTES with satisfaction that several organisations—notably the *International Schools Examination Syndicate* and the *Atlantic College*—have begun in concert to create an international university entrance examination;

COMMENDS this effort and urges national education authorities and institutions of higher education to give it their full support; and again

CALLS ON these authorities to initiate or to stimulate steps providing for the mutual acceptance by universities of diplomas and periods of study abroad.

### RECOMMENDATION II

The Conference,

*Considering* that it is highly necessary to get an ever-increasing number of people not only in the NATO countries but also in the other nations of the world aware of the ideals of the Atlantic civilization and to embrace those ideals;

*Considering* that being made up of the elected representatives of the peoples of the NATO countries, it has a natural responsibility to express the deep-seated aspirations of those peoples and to inspire a coordinated policy in order to extend the range of the Atlantic philosophy;



RECOMMENDS that each year the NATO Secretariat, informed by the national governments, provide the Conference with an account of their activities for the previous year in cultural and information matters, both in the national and the international fields, so that the Conference can assess the results and make proposals most likely to promote regular progress in that field.

## RECOMMENDATION III

The Conference,

*Considering* that the continuing effectiveness and growth of the Western Alliance depends, in considerable degree, upon the development of leadership in the member countries that is thoroughly grounded both in the broad aspects of Western culture and in the specific knowledge of the NATO area, its organisation and its problems;

*Considering* that the development of such leadership is primarily a task of education; and that this task can be accomplished only if curricula in higher education in member countries are so revised as to provide adequate studies of the Atlantic area, its organisation and its problems;

COMMENDS the studies and organisational efforts now underway in various countries, directed toward strengthening Atlantic studies;

URGES educational officials, private foundations and scholars to give special priority at this time to the task of establishing better university programmes both in Europe and in America for university students who wish to qualify as teachers in the study of the North Atlantic area, its problems, its organisation and its ideals.

## RECOMMENDATION IV

The Conference,

*Considering* that the knowledge of democratic philosophy and principles is essential to a common civilization;

*Considering* that the unity and aims of the NATO countries will be strengthened by worldwide acceptance of democratic ideals;

*Considering* that such ideals are best implemented by administrators in all countries who are trained in the philosophy and techniques of democratic administration;

RECOMMENDS the creation of a study commission to give immediate attention to the feasibility of establishing an educational centre for the training of civil servants, economic and social administrators of any and all nations, with particular attention to—

- middle level administration and administrators,
- democratic administrative techniques and values,
- the creation of a moderate sized centre staffed by a faculty of high reputation,
- the close co-operation of NATO and OECD governments in this endeavour.



It is a pity that each year the N.Y.P.C. is held in the same place, and that the same people are invited to attend. It is a pity that the same people are invited to attend, and that the same people are invited to attend.

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